Summary P. Vhrdy asserts the thesis that the vicious circle principle has the same structure as Russell's paradox. But structure is not the thing itself. It is the thing objectivated fron. the wiewpoint of a mathematician. So this structure can be expressed in a mathematical formalism, e. g. the h-calculus. Russell's paradox is understood as a result of the error of taking purely logical concepts, like negation, as lkiewise formalisable without change of meaning. The illusion of meaning in the liar's proposition: YI'am telling a lie' can also be explained be the formalisable self-referential structure of this proposition. Yet it remains an illusion because the logical intention cannot follow the structure.
In his paper on Russell's Vicious Circle Principle P. Vhrdy demonstrates that the vicious-circle principle, even in its most rogorous form, enBails a contradictimon if it is stated explicitly as an axiom of logic. Vgrdy remarks that KoyrC was already aware of this fact but that the latter took it for granted that the principle is not a statement in Russell's type theory. Now it is true that the vicious-circle principle is neither an axiom nor a rule for this theory. Yet it is true that the type-rules are justified by it. This justification is given in a theoretical context which might be considered as epitheory of type-theory. So the vicious circle principle is to be regarded as a statement of this epitheory. Vhrdy shows this epitheory to be inconsistent and therefore the justification of the type-rules to be fallacious. In this context it seems important to examine the inference of a contradiction from the vicious circle principle. Vardy states this inference as follows: "That it neither applies nor dmoes not apply to itself is known from the very interdiction itself". Or in another formulation: "Once more: in what sense is it meaningless to ingless at the same time: in the sense of the application of R's interdiction to itself as its own argument".
If the principle is formulated as: "all self-applications are meaningless", its self-application is seen to be equivalent to its own lack of meaning. This can also be formalised in the language of lambdacalculus. For that purpose we consider the function h x. lM(x(x)), wherein M(y) is taken to mean: "y is meaningful". If we call this function f, the universal quantification of f will be equivalent to the vicious circle principle in the last formulation given above.
From the definition of f it follows immediately that which is not surprising, because f(f) is constructed as the lambdatheoretical fixed point of the function hx. l(M(x)).
It follows that either f(f) is false and meaningful or that it is true but meaningless. The first possibility is inconsistent with the vicious circle principle, the second is contrary to common sense. Now several questions arise here. 1. How can one specify the "common sense" that excludes the second possibility and which is also presupposed by Vhrdy in the deduction of his contradiction? 2. Is there anything to be learned from a comparison of this application of the fixed point theorem (or "diagonal argument" as it used to be called") with other important applications (e. g. the paradoxes themselves and Godel's first theorem). 3. Since drawing border-lines is typical of mathematical understanding, it is not surprising that no border-line can be drawn between mathematically expressible ("meaningful" in Russell's sense) and nonmathemactically expressible concepts. Does this mean that mathematics is "undefinable" or that definition is not nessarily mathematically expressible?
Why does truth imply meaning?
This question reminds us of the usual scheme of logical formalisms: expressions are divided into meaningful and meaningless (well-formed formulas and other expressions) and the meaningful expressions are divided into true and false ones. But this scheme is only a formal way of stating the assumption that thruth implies meaning. Confronted with the question why, we find ourselves perplexed, possibly with a slight feeling in the background that there is something wrong with this question. And yet it is perfectly clear that an expression must have meaning before it can be judged to be either true or false. But it is precisely here that the pitfall lies. For now we are considering the expression as an element of an intentional act of a subject. Taken in this respect, as expression or as formal sign (as the scholastics would say), it must be meaningful and may be true or false. Thinking of the scheme of logical formalisms on the other hand, we take expressions not in their actual expressivity but as objects indicating nothing but themselves. Taken in this respect, as material sign, expressions are not meaningful or true by virtue of themselves but they can be classified under the headings "meaningful", "true", by means of syntactical or semantical rules. The "why" of these rules, however is not to be found within the definition of the system. This seems to be the reason of the rather puzzling character of the question whether truth implies meaning: in the one respect there is no problem, in the other there is no solution. This leads us back to the vicious circle principle, which seems to owe its life to on the same kind of ambiguity: an objective totality obviously cannot include itself but this does not prevent the corresponding act of objectivation from intending itself. The evident outcome of this line of thought is that the paradoxes teach us that the subject of mathematical thought cannot be its object. This result can be obtained from Godel's theorems in the more restricted and precise 'sense that the Eormalisation of mathematics essentially presupposes the mathematics of formalisation, i. e. mathematics as an activity, which as such is irreducible to a formal system, i. e. a mathematical object. Abraham Mostowski once expressed this obvious profundity with the simple words "I am not a set"!
Can negation escape its fixed point?
Curry's analysis of Russell's paradox4 shows that it is a consequence of the theorem that in a combinatorially complete formalism every function has a fixed point. In this context the construction of Russell's paradox appears as the construction of the fixed point of the negation operation. The fixed point of a function F is constructed by first defining f = lix.F(x(x)) and by then applying this function f to itself as an argument. The result is:
If F expresses negation we get an expression which is equivalent to its own negation: the liar's paradox. Now we should realise that a fixed point of the negation operation is impossible only if certain logical principles are accepted 5.
In view of the formalism, the only way out seems to be to restrict the scope of these principles to some domain of "well-behaved'' expressions. This is what, in very differcnt ways, is done by type theory, axiomatic set theory and other systems of the foundation of mathematics. But nothing prevents us from expressing such a restriction as an operation and from playing the same trick on it. If W(x) expresses the "good behaviour" of x, then by constructing the fixed point of Ax. l(W(x)) we find an expression (say g(g)) with the property i. e. an expression affirming its own " bad behaviour ". Now the affirmation that g(g) is badly-behaved is simultaneously an affirmation of g(g) itself.
Whether this is tolerable entirely depends on our criterion of "good behaviour ". If we immediately identify this concept with meaningfulness, we will find ourselves confronted with the above mentioned problems. If W represents the concept '' well-formed formula " in some logical formalism, by godelian methods something like g(g) will generally be constructable and provably false. Even Godel's first theorem itself can be regarded as an example of this construction, provided that W is interpreted as expressing provability. In that case g(g) is true and unprovable.
Another interesting example is Tarski's theorem, which we obtain if W is taken to represent truth as defined by a set of metamathematical rules. The well-know result is that this definition cannot be formalised within the system for which it is given. This is the post-g6delian form of the vicious circle principle: not a restriction on logic or meaning, but a restriction on formalisation, i.e. a restriction on the mathematical expressibility of logical concepts. But this insight makes us aware of a logical concept that thas been taken as mathematically expressible from the very beginning of mathematical logic without the least suspicion: the concept of negation. If we take Russell's paradox as seriously as we do Tarski's proof, the most obvious conclusion must be that the negation cannot be formalised. And the very reason for this is that self-application can be formalised! 7. This seems to be contrary to Russell's.
In formalisms allowing free variables in their well-formed formulas some quoting device is necessary to prevent ambiquity. In this case the second fixed point theorem of the lambda calculus is used to construct a formula A with the property A = 1 W(quote A). In this way it is possible, following Godel's methods, to define a well-formed formula expressing, be it incorrectly, its own not-well-formedness.
Cf. D. Scott: "A type-free system of functional abstraction". G. 3. Niessink: "Dekpuntstellingen van de A-calculus", Baccalaureaatsscriptie TH Twente, 1974. 7 Several logicians have pointed out that self-reference is not paradoxical in itself. Among them E. W. Beth in his "Foundations of mathematics", Amsterdam, 1950 (par. 159) : "However, the mere fact of self-reference strange though it is, cannot provide US with a satisfactory explanation of our paradox".
He then gives an example of a self-referring sentence which is meaningful and true: the sentence stating its own self referring character. The systems of combinatory logic and lambda calculus show that self-application is compatible with rigorous formalisation. Dana Scott even succeeded in constructing models for these systems.
Of course, certain characteristics of the use of the word " n o t " can be expressed by formal rules, just as this is possible with " true ", but this does not necessarily imply the adequate mathematical expressibility of the corresponding concepts.
Are concepts functions?
The attempts in mathematical logic to give mathematical definitions of logical concepts seem to originate from Frege's fundamental idea that all concepts are essentially functions. Yet Frege himself, while elaborating this idea in his " Begriffschrift ", soon faced the necessity of introducing an assertion-concept that could not be understood as a function.
In the factual development of mathematical logic, the thesis of the functional character of concepts has been restricted to mathematical and logical concepts. Concerning mathematical concepts the thesis still seems tenable but the results of mathematical logic have shown that, with reference to logical concepts, it is only their use in restricted mathematical theories that can be functionalised on the supposition of the consistency of these theories.
Let us try to investigate in the case of negation how this is to be understood. A function may be regarded as a determination of a mathematical object with respect to other such objects. Functions themselves can again obtain mathematical objectivity. They can of course be regarded directly as mathematical objects (of a higher type, Frege already would have said). But the equations they satisfy on the level of their arguments and values partly constitute their mathematical objectivity too. Especially a fixed point equation s of the form f(x) = x indicates a mathematical object with the property that it is determined by f with respect to itself. But determination with respect to itself can properly be called identity, so the identity of the fixed point is, in a certain restricted way, expressed by the function. This indicates an objectivity of the function in the domain of its arguments. If no cxternal restrictions are imposed, the connection between those two forms of mathematical objectivity of a function appears as a general feature of the universe of mathematical discourse. Fixed point theorems in type-free systems like lambda calculus can be regarded as examples of this phenomenon. It is clear that this ultimate consequence of the introduction of the concept of mathematical function is not compatible with the adequate representation of negation by a function.
The various type-restrictions in formal systems for the foundation of mathematics can now be interpreted as restrictions on the scope of this representation. The negation symbol is thus given the meaning of a partial function representing the use of negation within its domain. Extensions of the domain of such partial functions are bound sooner or later to lead to the inclusion of a fixed point. A monotonically increasing sequence of them " converges " to an adequate expression of negation somewhat in the same way as Eratosthenes' sieve "converges" towards the law of the prime numbers: always remaining infinitely inadequate, yet adequate for an increasing, bounded domain 9.
This confirms our conclusion that the use of negation within a bounded universe of discourse is mathematically expressible, but the concept of negation is not. This result is not surprising, because similar results have becn obtained for other logical concepts, such as implication and truth. Yet it is remarkable that negation always plays an important role in the proofs of such results.
Recapitulating we can interpret formulas like f(f) = N(f(f)) in at least three different ways: 1. We can conceive N as negation and f as a function lo. This leads to a contradiction, viz. Russell's paradox. 2. We can stick to the interpretation of f as a function but not to the interpretation of N as negation. This results in the innocent but mathe-9 Leibniz thought of his "v6ritts de fait" as approximations of God's rational selfknowledge. The idea of extending the mathematical concept of approximation beyond the scope of mathematics always meets with the same mathematical objection: approximation presupposes a metrisation and convergence presupposes a topology. If S(n) is a set of n objects numbered: n, n + 2, . . ., 2n -1, 2n, and we ask for the number of elements of lim S(n) two answers are possible:
1. it is infinite because the number of objects increases monotonically, 2. it is zero because none of the numbered objects can belong to the limit-set, Of course the ambiguity lies in the setting of the probIem: it is not given in what topology the limit is to be computed. This illustrates our point: 'Erathostenes' sieve approximates the set of prime numbers, not their law. The facts in the world approximate the state of the Universe, not its reason. A sequence of false hypotheses can never be said to approximate truth, which is also the problem with Karl Popper's theory of knowledge. So the systems of mathematical logic approximate the use of logic in mathematics, not logic itself. 10 We must remember that f is constructed from N by purely combinatory methods; if N is a function in the full sense, then so is f. As Curry's analysis of the Russell paradox has shown, there is no substantial difference between the set-theoretical and the function-theoretical formulation of it. (cf. note 3). 1,. E. Flcischhacker matically useful applications of the diagonal method as we find them e. g. in Tarski's theorem ll. 3. On the other hand we can insist on negation in the full logical sense but refrain from the mathematical interpretation of f as a function. This brings us back to the ancient liar's paradox which is -as Koyr6 pointed out -is not a contradiction but a " contre sens " 12. The liar's sentence only appears to be a statement about something but this appearance turns out to be false and so the sentence is disqualified as a judgement. This explanation of the paradox, given by KoyrC, leaves open the question of the origin of the appearance. The mathematical equivalents of the paradox, which we considered above, give us a clue. The diagonal construction is not meaningless in those cases but it always excludes a certain interpretation. It draws a qualitative border line within the domain of quantity or even -in the case of Russell's paradox of the domain of quantity itself 13. It shows, so to speak, the relativity of the structural point of view as such by virtue of its very structural properties. In so far as the liar's "sentence" reminds us of this construction it positively excludes its interpretation as a judgement, in so far as it does not, the " sentence " is completely pointless. So the appearance of meaning is not caused by confusing the factual statement and its intentional sense, as often$ thought but by confusing its mathematical structure and its intentional sense. It is precisely this structure that makes the absence of sense necessary in this " sentence ", and this necessity is the only reason why the liar's paradox has been considered as an interesting case. If the structural point of view is reached by abstraction from intentionality, the liar's paradox mirrors us in the position of the Baron von Miinchhausen if we try to make this abstraction absolute. Meaning as such is not structural, no more than I am a set. L. E. Fleischhacker.
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In this case it is not the fixed-point of the "negation" operator which is used, but the fixed-point of the functional product of this operator with some other function, representing e. g. truth, provability etc. This product represents a resticted concept of negation: negation of a certain (mathematical) property. So its fixed-point does not represent a paradox but the very limitations of the property in question. Dabei sind mir noch verschiedene Gesichtspunkte der Kritik eingefallen, und ich war dabei, diese fur eine Note in den "Dialectica" darzustellen, die ich der Publikation Ihrer Abhandlung beizufugen gedachte.
Inzwischen uberlegte ich mir, dass es wohl besser sei, wenn ich diese Kritik in Korrespondenz mit Ihnen bespraehe.
Meine Kritik richtet sich bereits gegen die von Ihnen erwahnte Behauptung von Herrn KOYRB, gemass welcher die Typentheorie nicht wahr sein kann, weil sie nicht auf sich selbst Anwendung hat. Die Typentheorie selbst gehort doch nicht zu den Gegenstanden, von denen sie handelt. Sie wird gar nicht von dem Zirkelprinzip getroffen, da sie, als Theorie, nicht ein Satz ist.
Um nunmehr direkt auf das RUSSELL'sche Zirkelprinzip zu kommen, so scheint mir, dass hier iiberhaupt nicht von einem eindeutigen Prinzip gesprochen werden kann. Es miissen mindestens vier Prinzipien unterschieden werden:
(1) "Whatever involves all of a collection, must not be one of (2) "If A is a class, then the statement 'A is not a member of (3) "A proposition can never be about itself" (i. e.: every self-(4) "All phrases referring to 'all propositions' are meaningthe collection".
A' is meaningless." referential proposition is meaningless) Die enge Abgrenzung des Begriffes "meaningful" bei RUSSELL ist dadurch verursacht, dass er nicht deutlich unterscheidet zwischen der Sprache der Philosophie und der Formalsprache einer mathematischen Theorie, die er konstituieren will, (und welche ihrerseits nur eine unter verschiedenen Moglichkeiten darstellt). So lasst sich zum Beispiel der Kontrast zwischen (1) und (2) dadurch beheben, dass man (2) als die Festsetzung interpretiert, wonach in der formalen Theorie Satzformeln von der Gestalt C E C ("C ist Element von C") sowie deren Negationen nicht zugelassen sind.
Kommen wir nun zu der These (3), auf welche sich ja Ihre Argumentation besonders bezieht. Die Ueberlegung von RUSSELL, ankniipfend an die Paradoxie des Lugners, ist doch hier etwa diese: Wenn wir einen Satz als wahr oder falsch erklaren, so ist dieses Urteil gegeniiber dem betreffenden Satz von einer hoheren Stufe. Eine Beurteilung eines Satzes durch diesen Satz selbst ist daher nicht sinnvoll. Die These (3) driickt dieses sehr unscharf aus, und sie erweckt die Vorstellung, als ob es eine allgemeine zweistellige Beziehung zwischen Satzen A, B gabe: "A is about B". Gerade nach RUSSELL'S Ansicht kann aber eine solche Beziehung "about" nur zwischen Satzen verschiedener Stufe bestehen, sodass ein Satz wie "A is about itself" und auch seine Negation schon grammatisch unzulassig sind. (XI -I Appl (X, X), Fur einen Allsatz (X) P (X) lasst sich der Begriff der "Anwendung" folgendermassen verdeutlichen:
Mit Venvendung der
(''t-f" stellt die Bi-Tmplikation dar).
A P P~ ((XI P (XI, Q) +-+ P (Q)
Nehmen wir in der letzten Formel fur P (X) den Ausdruck Appl (X, X) und setzen wir ausserdem C fur Q ein, so erhalten wir Appl ((X) -I Appl (X, XI, C) ++ -I A P P~ (C, C).
Und indem wir hierin fur
Diese "fallacy" ergibt sich aber nicht in der Typentheorie. Denn gemass der Typenregel kann eine Beziehung "A is about B" nur bestehen, wenn der Satz A von hoherem Typus ist als B. Das Pradikat "Appl" darf also nicht zwei Argumente von gleichem Typus haben. Ein Ausdruck ist daher in der Typentheorie syntaktisch unzulassig.
APPl (X, x>
Es ist also aufgrund dcs Zirkelprinzips nicht nur so, dass die Moglichkeit der Anwendung eines Satzes A auf sich selbst negiert wird, sondern die Frage nach dieser Anwendbarkeit ist bereits sinnlos, der Begriff dieser Anwendbarkeit unstatthaft. Innerhalb der Typentheorie braucht man auch einen solchen Begriff nicht zu benutzen. Die These (3) kann demnach auch nicht als Satz der Typentheorie, vielmehr nur als eine provisorische heuristische Formulierung gelten. Das Bewusstsein um den provisorischen Charakter solcher Formulierungen und ihre Problematik ist besonders eindriicklich zum Ausdruck gebracht in WITT-GENSTETN's Ausspruch im "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus~7, der sich ja besonders den Gedankengangen der RUSSELL'schen Theorie widmet: "6. Wie schon gesagt, kann uberhaupt nicht einfach von dem Zirkelprinzip gesprochen werden, sondern es miissen die verschiedenen Fassungen unterschieden werden.
Bei der Beriicksichtigung des RUSSELL'schen Paradoxons in der Mengenlehre handelt es sich um die Fassung (l), d. h. um die Zuordnung von Mengen zu Pradikaten. Die "self-reference" von Satzen kommt bei den semantischen Paradoxien zur Geltung, welche fur die Mathematik nicht zu einer Einschrankung in der Anlage der Theorien Anlass geben, wohl aber bei den Fragen der Darstellbarkeit von Begriffen, der Entscheidbarkeit und der Beweisbarkeit sich geltend machen.
